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1GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1975). “There would be many crimes and errors which it would 
be beyond (a person’s) power to commit, simply because they were nameless and therefore 
unimaginable. Newspeak was designed not to extend but to diminish the range of thought, and 
this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum. Take 
for example the well-known passage from the declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that the are 
endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights,  that among these are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights,  Governments are 
instituted among men, deriving their power from the consent of the governed. That 
whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of those ends, it is the right of 
the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government . . . 
It would have been quite impossible to render this into Newspeak while keeping the 
original. The nearest one could come to doing so would be to swallow up the whole 
passage in the single word crimethink.” 
2M.A. Applied Linguistics, UCLA, 1991; J.D. Washington College of Law, American 
University, 2002.  For Ann, Bertram, WSM and Zelda. Lovers of knowledge, truth and justice. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the early morning hours of July 23, 1995 Sandra Houghton, a passenger in an 
automobile,3 thought she was protected by the Fourth Amendment.4  She thought she 
had a guaranteed right to be secure in her person against unreasonable searches and 
seizures based solely upon police discretion.  She also thought that absent a warrant, 
the police would need to base any search and seizure of her person and/or her 
belongings upon individualized probable cause. 
Sandra Houghton had no idea that the Court would use her case to help eliminate 
Fourth Amendment guarantees.5  The language of the Majority in Wyoming v. 
Houghton6 is reminiscent of legal scholar Akhil Reed Amar7 who champions the 
                                                                
3Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).  The United States Supreme Court granted 
Wyoming’s writ of certiorari to rule on whether police officers violated the Fourth 
Amendment when they searched the personal belongings of a passenger inside an automobile 
that they had probable cause to believe contained contraband.  The question as stated by the 
Court makes no direct mention of the issue concerning lack of individualized suspicion and 
probable cause. 
4
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
5For an impression of Justice Scalia’s view on the Fourth Amendment see California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  “The Fourth Amendment does 
not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures . . . What it explicitly states 
regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirements of their 
use.”  Id. 
6526 U.S. at 295. 
7Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. 
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complete erasure8 of the exclusionary rule9 and the redefining of the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment10 altogether. 
Until Houghton the Court steadfastly held that the so-called “automobile 
exception”11 to the warrant requirement did not apply to a search of an automobile 
passenger12 or her belongings by virtue of her “mere presence”13 in a suspected car14 
without individualized probable cause.15  
The Court previously rejected the notion that the container in which contraband 
could be hidden established the scope of a warrantless search of a vehicle16.  Rather, 
the Court defined the scope by the object of the search and the places where there 
was probable cause to believe the contraband could be found.17  
The focus of the Fourth Amendment is the people18 and individualized probable 
cause pertaining to them.  In Houghton the Court has constructed a new lexicon that 
                                                                
8Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 761 
(1994).  “Make no mistake: I come to praise the Fourth Amendment, not to gut it.” The choice 
of allusion to Mark Antony’s speech in William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar is an unfortunate 
choice. Mark Antony’s “ I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.” (William Shakespeare, 
Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. II) speech has been understood from its inception to be an 
ironic/satirical foil for Antony to praise Caesar under the noses of the authorities. Does Amar 
intend for us to understand that he really does come to gut the amendment and not to praise it? 
9Id. at 758. Amar believes that the exclusionary rule must be done away with in favor of 
civil juries and civil damage actions in which government officials are to be held liable for 
unreasonable intrusions against person, property and privacy.  
10Id. “The Fourth Amendment today an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court 
has said in the last half century—that the Amendment generally calls for warrants and 
probable cause for all searches and seizures, and exclusion of all searches and seizures, and 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence—is initially plausible but ultimately misguided.”  Id. 
at 757.  “The words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean what they say.  They do not 
require warrants, even presumptively, for searches and seizures.  They do not require probable 
cause for all searches and seizures without warrants.”  Id. at 801. 
11Lawrence A. Mintz, Requiem for the Exclusionary Rule, 19 HOWARD L. REV. 161 
(1976). 
12United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S 581 (1948) (holding that the existence of reasonable 
cause for searching an automobile believed to be carrying contraband does not warrant the 
search of an occupant thereof, especially when if the contraband sought might be concealed on 
the person). 
13Id. at 585. 
14526 U.S. at 295. 
15Id. at 309. 
16United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (the Court reasoned that the scope of the 
warrantless search of an automobile is not defined but the nature of the container but rather by 
the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe the contraband 
will be found).  
17Id. at 824. 
18Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 359 (Mar. 1994). 
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alters the accepted focus of the Fourth Amendment, the warrant requirement and the 
exclusionary rule, to the contents of the automobile.19 
The decision in Houghton is the most recent of the Supreme Court’s efforts to gut 
the Fourth Amendment and constrict the protections afforded by the exclusionary 
rule under the guise of maintaining a balance20 between effective law enforcement 
and individual privacy21.  
On the surface, Houghton seems like the next logical step in the present Court’s 
gutting of the Fourth Amendment in general and the exclusionary rule in particular.  
Yet, by allowing police officers to search the belongings of a passenger, without 
individualized probable cause, the court has redefined the guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment.   
Over the past 30 years, the Court has redefined the exclusionary rule,22 and the 
scope23 and content 24 of the Fourth Amendment.  In 1975 Justice Brennan 
challenged his colleagues on the Burger Court25 by saying that if they (were) 
determined to discard the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they should 
                                                                
19526 U.S. at 295. 
20Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (holding that a police officer who lawfully 
stops a vehicle for a traffic violation has the right to order the driver out of the automobile to 
protect the officer’s safety).  See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (holding that a police 
officer can lawfully order a driver to exit the vehicle as reasonable and wholly objective under 
the totality of the circumstances).  See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (holding 
that a police officer can lawfully order a passenger to exit the vehicle when stopped on a 
routine traffic violation even when the officer has no reason to suspect a passenger has 
committed a crime of threatened an officer’s safety). 
21Chris K. Visser, Comment, Without a Warrant, Probable Cause, or Reasonable 
Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While Driving a Car, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1683, 1724 (1999). In evaluating Fourth Amendment reasonableness the Court balances 
law enforcement interests against privacy, balancing; 1) the officer’s safety in avoiding violent 
confrontations during traffic stops; and 2) minimizing the hazard of injury to an injury of a 
police office standing by the side of the road, against minimal intrusions into a driver’s 
privacy. 
22Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that the exclusionary rule did not require 
suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment where erroneous 
information leading to a search resulted from a clerical error of court employees who did not 
keep records up to date). 
23United States v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (stating that a defendant was not seized 
until the officer tackled him. Thus the drug discarded before the chase were admitted into 
evidence). 
24California v. Ciraola, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (stating that warrantless aerial observation of 
fenced areas adjacent to a home was not an “unreasonable” search under the Fourth 
Amendment).  See also John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment:  The Scope 
of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105 (1989). 
25The Warren Court 1953-1969.  See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 251-95 (3d ed. 1992) (for a 
discussion of the make up the Warren Court and an analysis of the underling motivation in the 
process of presidential selection and appointments). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/8
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do so forthrightly and be done with it and not “covertly” erode an important rule 61 
years in the making.26  
Twenty-four years later his challenge becomes even more relevant as the Burger 
Court’s progeny27 continues the dismemberment of the Fourth Amendment and the 
exclusionary rule. 
This Note contends that the Court’s decision to adopt the Houghton approach to 
the automobile warrant exception is problematic for three reasons.  First, the Court 
has erroneously interpreted the historical evidence behind the creation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Second, the Court, by chipping away at stare decisis, is disrupting the 
foundations of American jurisprudence and the development of the law.  Third, by 
creating a new lexicon, changing the meanings of the words, the Court is trying to 
define away the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
This Note will briefly summarize the facts of Houghton and review the historical 
purpose for the creation of the Fourth Amendment and then summarize the Court’s 
opinion and the dissenting opinion.  Finally, this note will analyze the significance of 
this “newly minted”28 test. 
II.  SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On July 23, 1995, Sandra Houghton was one of three people in the front seat of a 
car stopped by a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer for speeding and driving with a 
faulty brake light.29  While the officer questioned David Young (the driver) he 
noticed a syringe in Young’s shirt pocket.30  The officer called for back up and 
returned to the car and asked Young what the syringe was for; Young answered that 
he used it to take drugs.31  Backup officers asked the two passengers to identify 
themselves and Houghton stated falsely that she was Sandra James and that she did 
not have identification.32  
The officer searching Young’s car, in light of his admission, found a purse on the 
back seat of the car that Houghton claimed as hers.33  Continuing the search of the 
purse, the officer found a wallet, which he opened and removed from it, a driver’s 
license identifying Sandra K. Houghton.34  The officer also found a brown pouch 
containing drug paraphernalia and a syringe with 60 ccs of methamphetamine; 
Houghton denied this was hers and stated she was ignorant of how it came to be in 
                                                                
26United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561-62 (1975).  “To attempt covertly the erosion 
of an important principle over 61 years in the making as applied to federal courts clearly 
demeans the adjudicatory function, and the institutional integrity of this Court.”  Id. 
27The Rehnquist Court 1986-Present.  See Abraham, supra note 25, at 349-69 (for a 
discussion on the make up of the Rehnquist Court and its views). 
28526 U.S. at 310. 
29Id. at 297. 
30Id. at 298. 
31Id. 
32Id. 
33526 U.S. at 298. 
34Id. 
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her purse.35  The officer arrested Houghton.36  The State of Wyoming charged 
Houghton with felony possession of methamphetamine.37 
On appeal Houghton raised several challenges to her conviction including the 
district court’s denial of her motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse.38  
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding that an officer with 
probable cause to search a vehicle may search all containers that might conceal the 
object of the search; but, if the officer knows or should have known that a container 
belongs to a passenger who is not suspected of criminal activity, then the container is 
outside the scope of the search unless someone had the opportunity to conceal 
contraband within it to avoid detection.39  The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s denial of the motion to suppress40 and remanded the case for 
disposition in accord with their opinion.41 
The United States Supreme Court granted Wyoming’s writ of certiorari to rule on 
whether police officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched the 
personal belongings of a passenger inside an automobile that they had probable 
cause to believe contained contraband.42  The court held that “[p]olice officers with 
probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car 
that are capable of concealing the object of the search.”43 
III.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Shared Vision: The Framers and the Fourth Amendment 
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment shared a common moment in time.  They 
reflected on a past of Writs of Assistance,44 James Otis’ role in the Paxton Case in 
                                                                
35Id. 
36Id.  The officer also found fresh needle-track marks on Houghton’s arms. 
37Id.  Houghton was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine in a liquid 
amount greater than three-tenths of a gram which is punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than 5 years and a fine not more than $2,500.00 or both under WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1031 
(c) (iii) (Supp. 1996).   
38Houghton v. Wyoming, 956 P.2d 363, 364 (1998).  The trial court reasoned that the 
officer had probable cause to search the car for contraband and thus all containers therein that 
could hold contraband.  
39Id. at 372. 
40Id. at 366 n.2.  The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that the Wyoming Constitution 
article 1 § 4 is somewhat stronger than its federal counterpart, in that it is mandatory that the 
search warrant be issued upon affidavit. 
41Id. at 372. 
42Houghton, 526 U.S. at 298.  The question as stated by the Court makes no direct mention 
of the issue concerning lack of individualized suspicion and probable cause. 
43Id. at 295. 
44Visser, supra note 21, at 1700.  
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1761,45 the Sugar Act of 1764,46 the seizure of John Hancock’s sloop, the Liberty in 
1768,47 the Wilkes Case in 176948 and widespread intimidation and corruption by 
customs inspectors49 who were granted unchallenged authority to search and seize50 
under the auspices of the Vice-Admiralty Courts. 
An historical inquiry into the Framers’ intent in creating the Fourth Amendment 
must be viewed in terms of the drafters shared consensus of what those categories 
were.51  The Framers did not need to enumerate the specific categories of searches 
and seizures they thought unreasonable.  The Framers’ discourse reflected their 
shared cultural sensibilities when they wrote:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.52  
B.  The People 
The first words of the Fourth Amendment reflect the Framers concern for the 
people and their ‘rights’.  The Framers did not view “the people” as merely a 
collection of private interests.53  The Debates of the Convention of Virginia on the 
drafting of the Constitution reflect the controversy the term “the People” ignited.54  
Some delegates believed that “[t]he origin of the General Government, the source of 
                                                                
45Id. at n.118.  The British government used writs of assistance (among other things) to 
enforce import duties . . . to prevent the American colonies from trading outside the British 
Empire.  Sixty-three Boston merchants challenged the writs and hired James Otis, Jr. to argue 
the case.  “He was a flame of fire!  Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go 
away, as I did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance . . .  Then and there the Child 
Independence was born.” (citing John Adams Memoirs). 
46Bacigal, supra note 18, at 366. 
47Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Overview, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 925, 964 (1997). 
48Id. at 933. 
49Bacigal, supra note 18, at 377. 
50Id. at 372. 
51Maclin, supra note 47, at 974 n.270. 
52U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
53Bacigal, supra note 18, at 384.  “Values are public as well private in origin, originating 
in political engagement and dialogue as well as in private experience . . . The people 
conceived of themselves as acting to advance the public interest, and they came together to 
discuss, to deliberate upon, and ultimately to decide on the court their society would take.” 
(citing Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What’s Really Wrong with Rational 
Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 509 (1979)). 
54JOHN B. DILLON, NOTES ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 42 (1871) (Bayard’s Brief Exposition of the Constitution of the United States 
from Debates of the Convention of Virginia 1788). 
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all its power, was a matter too important to be left in doubt, and it is therefore 
declared to be ordained and established by ‘the People of the United States.’”55  
Others believed the introductory expression of ‘We the People” improper.56  ‘The 
People’ for whom the contrivances of States, Kingdoms and Empires are intended57 
carried the day over those who believed “We the State governments”58 might be 
more proper. 
C.  Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
The American experience of unreasonable searches and seizures from many 
quarters led the Framers to create the right to be free from promiscuous intrusion.59  
Viewing the general warrant as law enforcement instruments that substantially 
undermined their privacy and security, Americans strongly resented them.60  In the 
most widely held protests on the search process prior to the amendment, the 
Continental Congress, in 1774, had unconditionally condemned promiscuous, 
warrantless searches by customs and excise officers.61  “Legislation, case law, legal 
treatises, pamphlets, newspapers, constitutional debates, and correspondence in 
America during the 1780’s condemned not only the general warrant but also other 
methods of search and seizure so consistently that their constitutional designation as 
unreasonable would have been almost superfluous.”62  Some scholars believe that the 
history behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures tells us more than the nebulous language of the text about the right.63  
Conversely, there are scholars who contend that as long as government officials act 
reasonably when they intrude upon privacy and property, the commands of the 
Fourth Amendment have been satisfied.64   
D.  The Warrant, Probable Cause and the Neutral Magistrate 
Perhaps more so than any other provision of the Bill of Rights, the Fourth 
Amendment is profoundly antigovernment.65  More than any other constitutional 
                                                                
55Id. at 43.  
56Id.  
57Id. at 44. 
58Id. at 43.  
59Maclin, supra note 47, at 954-55. 
60Id. 
61Id. at 955 n.178.  “In short the debate on search and seizure of 1787-88 not only 
provided impetus for what became the Fourth Amendment but defined its contents.  That 
debate connected the enlarged understanding of unreasonable searches and seizures that had 
emerged after 1782 with the guarantee against those procedures of 1789.”  Id. 
62Id. at 974. 
63Id. at 938. 
64Amar, supra note 8, at 757-58. 
65Bacigal, supra note 18, at 363 n.15 (stating that “more than any other single 
constitutional provision the amendment stands between us and the police state, for its central 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/8
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provision, the Fourth Amendment stands between the people and a police state, for it 
contends that police (or other governmental) conduct that interferes with a person’s 
liberty, bodily integrity, or right to exclude others from what is his shall be subject to 
judicial control.66   
The Framers understood the need for specific warrants based on probable cause 
approved by a neutral magistrate when they wrote “ . . . no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”.67   
Between 1776 and 1787, the American Law of search and seizure underwent a 
transformation that separated it from British law.  The most obvious mark of that 
transformation was the written constitutional acknowledgment of a right respecting 
search and seizure by most of the new states.68  
The colonial experience of general warrants and writs of assistance led to 
colonial legislative bodies, like Massachusetts Bay, enacting bills establishing the 
specific warrant as the conventional means of search and seizure.69  Americans in the 
1760’s began to reject the general warrant not only because it was not specific but 
also because they associated it with the violent British efforts to subjugate them 
politically70.  
The probable cause requirement became a focus for the colonists when British 
searches of American ships began to threaten not only their privacy, but also their 
economic livelihoods.  The Sugar Act of 1764 barred shipowners from suing the 
customs officers who seized their vessels if a judge found, retrospectively, probable 
cause to seize the ship.71  This, along with the deputizing of Royal Navy personnel as 
customs agents and the seizing of ships belonging to Henry Laurens of South 
Carolina and John Hancock of Massachusetts, lead to organized protests over the 
wrongful seizure of their ships without probable cause.  A Boston Town Meeting 
                                                          
premise is that police . . . conduct . . . shall be subject to judicial control) (citing JAMES B. 
WHITE, JUSTICE IN TRANSLATION 177 (1990)). 
66Bacigal, supra note 18, at 362. 
67U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
68Maclin, supra note 47, at 972-73. 
69Id. at 942-44 (revealing that within two years of the Excise controversy the specific 
warrant as the standard mode of search and seizure in the colonies.  Although these early 
specific warrants would not meet current constitutional standards, many contained various 
procedural safeguards that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment would subsequently 
incorporate). 
70Id. at 943 n.94 (hostility toward general warrants and promiscuous intrusions in 
Massachusetts dates back to at least the mid-seventeenth century.  In 1644, after a sheriff 
entered a boarding house without a warrant to arrest a drunk, an angry mob unsuccessfuly 
attempted to rescue the man). 
71Maclin, supra note 47, at 961 nn. 207 & 209. 
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report organized by James Otis Jr.72 and John Adams complained that confiscation of 
the ships was without probable cause.73  
The text of the Fourth Amendment did not emerge in a vacuum.74  The right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure owes much to history.  The specific 
warrant mandated by the Warrant Clause evolved over centuries of legal thought and 
practice . . . the evolutionary process that produced the Amendment also brought 
about the renunciation of historic precedent.75  The Fourth Amendment did not 
emerge from colonial precedents; rather it repudiated them.76   
The Framers of the Constitution created the Fourth Amendment as a direct 
response to the practically unrestrained and judicially unsupervised searches 
associated with general warrants and writs of assistance.77 
E.  The Birth of the Exclusionary Rule. The Twin Imperatives: Judicial Integrity and 
Deterrence 
The earliest method of suppressing unreasonable searches and seizures was not 
the exclusionary rule, but monetary punishments that juries imposed on those who 
searched and seized unlawfully.78  The prospect of incurring financial ruin at the 
                                                                
72Visser, supra note 21, at 1700 (commenting that when Mr. Otis raised the then-
controversial argument that courts should review legislation and overturn illegitimate laws, he 
helped sow the seeds of later American constitutional practice). 
73Maclin, supra note 47, at 962. 
74Id. at 938 (noting that several centuries of British and American legal theory and practice 
gave shape and meaning to the Fourth Amendment).  Id. at 938 n.65 (stating that the text of 
the Fourth Amendment articulated ideas that had percolated through Anglo-American law for 
centuries).   
75Id. at 972. 
76LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 139, 224 
(1988).  See Maclin, supra note 47, at 972 (“[t]he ideas comprising the Fourth Amendment 
reversed rather than formalized colonial precedents. Reasonable search and seizure in colonial 
America closely approximated whatever the searcher thought reasonable.”).  See also Amar, 
supra note 8, at 767-68.  Contradicting this thinking by criticizing the warrant preference rule 
(which holds that a judicial warrant is a necessary precondition of a reasonable search unless 
good reasons call for proceeding without one) as not expressly provided for in the Amendment 
and lacking historical support in eighteenth or nineteenth century thinking on the subject.  Id. 
77Visser, supra note 21, at 1683, 1699.  See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01 
(1959) (noting that abuses associated with general warrants and writs of assistance prompted 
the authors of various state declarations of rights, early courts, and the Framers of the 
Constitution to require probable cause as a prerequisite to issuance of a warrant to arrest or 
search); See also JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, 20-
21 (1966) (describing the Fourth Amendment as a procedural safeguard rooted in American 
and English experiences).   
78Maclin, supra note 47, at 935 n.59.  See Amar, supra note 8, at 757-67 (describing a 
structure to return to civil remedies); see also Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch The 
Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964) (describing civil tort remedies to Fourth Amendment 
violations). 
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hands of a jury undercut the incentive to conduct any search and seizure that the 
community, in the form of a jury, might find unreasonable.79  
Since the text of the Fourth Amendment provides no remedy for its violation, 
courts for over a century after the Revolution admitted evidence obtained in an 
illegal search.80  Not until 1866 did the Supreme Court decision in Boyd v. United 
States81 plant the seed of what was to become the exclusionary rule.82  The Court 
concluded that papers and books illegally seized had to be excluded as a by-product 
of the Fifth Amendment ban on compelling a man to be witness against himself.83  
The Court in Boyd did not link the violation to the Fourth Amendment.84  In 1904 the 
Court attempted to distinguish Adams v. New York85 from Boyd and essentially 
overruled the earlier case.  In Adams the court found no unreasonable search and 
seizure had occurred86 but stated that even if a search were unreasonable, a court 
could not stop during a trial to address the issue of how police officers obtained 
evidence.87 
Ten years after Adams the Court developed and used the exclusionary rule in 
federal criminal trials in its landmark decision in Weeks v. United States.88 Weeks 
also established the “judicial integrity” rationale for the exclusionary rule believing 
that restraints and limits must be put on officers and courts so that evidence obtained 
in an illegal search and seizure will not be protected under the guise of law.89  
                                                                
79Elisa Masterson White, Criminal Procedure: Good Faith, Big Brother, and You: The 
United States Supreme Court’s Latest Good Faith Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule.  Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995), 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 
533, 537 (1996).  A common law remedy of a civil suit was what the British common law 
applied when no specific enacted law contradicted it.  Id. (citing BRADFORD P. WILSON, 
ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY (1986)). 
80White, supra note 79, at 537.  
81116 U.S. 616 (1866) (noting that only testimonial evidence such as papers or books—not 
contraband such as drugs or guns—had to be excluded because the exclusion was a by-product 
of the Fifth Amendment’s ban on compulsory testimony).  
82Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617. The opinion did not make clear whether the Fourth Amendment 
violation alone required the exclusion. 
83Id. at 633. 
84Id. at 630-35.  Justice Miller’s concurring opinion found no Fourth Amendment search 
or seizure violation in this case.  Id. at 638-40 (Miller, J. concurring). 
85192 U.S. 585 (1904). 
86Id. at 594.  Officers received a warrant for “gambling paraphernalia” but also seized 
other private papers and used them in evidence against the defendant at trial.  Id. 
87Id. at 595. 
88232 U.S. 383 (1914).  After the defendants arrest in his place of business a U.S. Marshall 
searched his home and confiscated his property without a search warrants.  Id. at 386.  This 
case was distinguished from Boyd by basing the reversal of the lower court’s ruling on the 
Fourth Amendment alone.  Id. at 390-91. 
89Id. at 388.  See also Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 469-71 (1928) (“[i]f the 
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law.”) (Brandies, J., dissenting).   
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Although the Court continued to broaden the exclusionary rule over the next 
forty-seven years90 it was not until 1961 in its landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio,91 
that the Court held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments required 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence be excluded in state, as well as, federal courts.92  
The Warren Court93 majority in Mapp continued the “imperative of judicial 
integrity” and deterrence rationale as the purpose of the exclusionary rule,94 
calculated to prevent and not repair, to deter and thereby to compel respect for the 
Constitution by removing any incentive to disregard it.95  The decision was met with 
great controversy.96 
Seven years later in Terry v. Ohio,97 Chief Justice Warren conceded some 
problems inherent in the exclusionary rule established in Mapp, recognizing that the 
rule had its limits as a tool of judicial control and in some contexts the rule was 
ineffective as a deterrent.98  
                                                                
90Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (the Court moved away 
from the property based application of the Fourth Amendment and forbade the government to 
use papers or derivative property illegally seized).  See also Bradford P. Wilson, Forgotten 
Points in the “Exclusionary Rule Debate”, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1278-79 (1983); Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).  (The Court applied the Fourth Amendment to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, but the evidence was still admissible 
in federal court).  Id.  See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 n.2 (1960) (the 
Court reexamined what had become known as the “silver platter doctrine”) (quoting Lustig v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (holding that federal courts must suppress evidence 
obtained by state officers)).  Id. 
91367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
92Id. at 655. 
93The Warren Court 1953-1969.  See Abraham, supra note 25, at 251-95 (for a discussion 
of the make up the Warren Court and an analysis of the underling motivation in the process of 
presidential selection and appointments). 
94367 U.S at 659.  See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223-24 (discussing the “imperative of judicial 
integrity” as a reason to exclude illegally obtained evidence). 
95Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221. 
96Burger, supra note 78, at 1 (describing the inefficiency of the rule).  See RICHARD 
NIXON, TOWARDS FREEDOM FROM FEAR 13 (1968).  “The barbed wire of legalisms that a 
majority of one of the supreme Court has erected to protect a suspect from invasion of his 
rights has effectively shielded  hundreds of criminals from punishment.”  See also Richard 
Nixon, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1968 at 20 col.4 (on the night he accepted the candidacy for 
president, “Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them, but let us 
also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the 
peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country”). 
97392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing limited searches of the outer clothing of a person 
detained to detect weapons). 
98Id. at 12-15.  The Chief Justice came to believe that the rule could not be properly 
invoked to exclude products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that 
much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional 
protections.  Id. 
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F.  The Demise of the Exclusionary Rule: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The twin imperatives of judicial integrity and deterrence99 were immediately 
taken up after the establishment of the judicially conservative, strict constructionist100 
Burger Court.101  In 1969, with Alderman v. United States102 the court determined 
that standing applied only to those whose rights had been violated.103  The decision 
applied a cost-benefit analysis104 based on the reasoning that the benefit of deterring 
police misconduct by extending the exclusionary rule to third parties would not 
outweigh the cost of allowing the more guilty criminals go free.105  
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger called for the creation of other remedies to the 
exclusionary rule and then its abandonment in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.106  Two other cases tried that same year, Whitley v. 
Warden107 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire,108 failed to convince a majority of 
Justices that the Fourth Amendment does not expressly command that evidence 
obtained by an infraction should always be excluded from evidence.  Yet the Chief 
Justice asserted that judicial integrity was not necessarily damaged by inclusion of 
tainted evidence and suggested that there be some narrowing of the rule’s thrust to 
                                                                
99Norman M. Robertson, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The Burger Court and the 
Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. R. 139, 152 (1977). 
100Id. at 150-54.  Richard Nixon was in a unique position. Between 1969 and 1971 he 
filled the Chief Justice position with Warren Burger and when Justices White and Black 
retired, Nixon appointed William Rehnquist (the present Chief Justice) and Lewis Powell.  
With the ascent of Rehnquist and Powell the Nixon Court was complete and the majority of 
judicial conservatism was ripe to create grave limits on the exclusionary rule’s power.  See 
JAMES F. SIMON, IN HIS OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON’S AMERICA 
(1973) (for further discussion on the strategy for choosing the Justices at 122-48). 
101The Burger Court 1969-1986.  See Abraham, supra note 25, at 296-348 (for a 
discussion on the make up of the Burger Court and its views). 
102394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
103Id. at 171-72. 
104WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE A TREATIES ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 11.4(f) 294-99 (1996) (for a discussion on deterrence and cost-benefit analyses). 
105Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75. 
106403 U.S. 388, 420 (1971).  “Instead of continuing to enforce the suppression doctrine 
inflexibly, rigidly, and mechanically, we should view it as one of the experimental steps in the 
great tradition of the common law and acknowledge its shortcomings.  But in the same spirit 
we should be prepared to discontinue what the experience of over half a century has shown 
neither deters errant officers nor affords a remedy to the totally innocent victims of official 
misconduct.  I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression doctrine until some 
meaningful alternative can be developed.”  Id.  (Burger, C. J., dissenting).   
107401 U.S. 560 (1971) (holding that an arrest made by police based on a police bulletin 
issued without probable cause was therefore an arrest made without probable cause).  
108403 U.S. 443 (1971) (holding that a neutral magistrate was required to issue a warrant 
and in this case the State Attorney General had issued a warrant in his capacity of justice of 
the peace). 
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eliminate the anomalies it had produced.109  It was in Coolidge that Justice Harlan 
called for Mapp to be overruled and that there be a re-examination of the rule based 
on a Court examination of the experience of the states.110 
During the years 1973 to 1975 the Court fashioned a set of new doctrines in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,111 United States v. Robinson,112 United States v. 
Calandra113 and United States v. Peltier.114  Justice Brennan believed that if the 
vague contours of the Burger Court’s newly fashioned rules were to be filled in, it 
                                                                
109Id. at 454.  See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).  Two studies noting that the deterrent value is minimal.  Some 
of the reasons cited in the study are: 
The application of the rule only benefits the guilty.  The innocent man whose rights 
are violated gains no advantage from the exclusionary rule.  He must sue civilly to 
secure damages.  The procedure which gives nothing to the innocent yet gives 
freedom to the guilty, destroys respect for law far more than police misconduct will. 
The rule fosters false testimony by police officers who are under severe public 
pressure to apprehend offenders and are fearful that minor technical errors will result 
in their escape. 
The existence of the exclusionary rule creates a haven for the corrupt law enforcement  
officer and allows him to immunize an offender while appearing to do an aggressive 
job of law enforcement.  Id. 
110403 U.S at 492-93. 
111412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that warrantless searches may be conducted with the 
voluntary consent of the target even without a specific warning by the police advising the 
suspect of his right to withhold consent). 
112414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that a full search of a person incident to a full custody 
arrest may be undertaken without regard to what a court may later decide was the probability 
of was that the detainee was carrying a weapon or not).  See Robertson, supra note 99, at 156.  
(A clear and broad exception to the warrant requirement was thus recognized). 
113414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that a grand jury witness may not refuse to testify 
concerning evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment).  The Court held that 
questioning a witness based on illegally seized evidence is a “derivative use” of evidence and 
is not a further violation of the Constitution.  (Calandra essentially followed the pattern of 
cost-benefit analysis established in Alderman).  Id. at 354.  
114422 U.S. 531 (1975) (holding that if the police officer believed in reasonable good faith 
that the evidence they seized would be admissible in court, the imperative of judicial integrity 
would not be offended ).  This case was decided a short time after the Court held, in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1975), that a warrantless automobile search by border 
police conducted without probable cause was unconstitutional under the fourth amendment.  
But the Court decided that it did not have to make Almeida-Sanchez retroactive in this case.  
Id. 
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would forecast the demise of the exclusionary rule115 and cause the judicial 
development of Fourth Amendment rights to be stopped “dead in its tracks.”116  
G.  Filling in the Contours: The Automobile Exceptions 
During this century the Court has created numerous exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, including attenuation,117 independent source,118 inevitable 
discovery119, and good faith exceptions.120 
The so-called “automobile exception”121 to the warrant requirement was first 
enunciated by the Court in 1925 in Carroll v. United States.122  The mobility doctrine 
was slow to develop, but by the 1970’s the Court began to focus on not only 
extending the Carroll Doctrine123 itself but also on extending the scope of the 
                                                                
115Peltier, 422 U.S. at 551.  See Mintz, supra note 11, at 161.  See also U.S. v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).  The rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved.  With that one rule the Court seemed to settle the 
question of the rule’s constitutional basis.  Id. 
116Peltier, 422 U.S. at 554.  See Mintz, supra note 11, at 171.  “If this narrow construction 
is furthered the problem arises of what, exactly, the police office will be held responsible for 
knowing.”  Id.  See also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 391 (1973) (holding that probable 
cause to arrest a suspect also justifies a search of that suspect incident to arrest). 
117Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (allowing courts to admit evidence if the 
causal connection between the illegal search and the evidence is sufficiently attenuated). 
118371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that narcotics discovered from statements made by an 
illegally arrested defendant did not come under the independent source exception). 
119Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (holding that despite illegal questioning of a 
defendant, which lead to the discovery of the victims body, the search party would have 
inevitably discovered the body). 
120United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Court must sometimes 
consider competing goals of interest: deterring official misconduct or removing procedures 
under which criminal defendants are acquitted based on evidence that might expose the truth).  
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that exclusion of evidence based on 
incorrect court records kept by court employees would not deter the employees from keeping 
erroneous records since they were not involved in the arrest process).  The Constitution does 
not expressly forbid the use of evidence collected in an illegal search, the Court stated that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to all Fourth Amendment violations.  Id. at 10-16.   
121Mintz, supra note 11, at 164. 
122267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that if a warrantless search and seizure is conducted on an 
automobile made upon probable cause reasonably arising out of the circumstances known to 
the seizing officer, the search and seizure is valid).  
123John R. Werner, Editor-In-Chief Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll 
doctrine to Moveable Items, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1134, 1145-49 (1973).  The proposition that the 
mobility of an automobile supplied the exigent circumstances for a search without a warrant 
upon probable cause allowed the Carroll Doctrine to retain validity long after the National 
Prohibition Act, Title II, ch. 85 §§ 25-26, 41 Stat. 315 (1919), on which it was based, was 
repealed in 1935.  Extending the doctrine allows the police to respond quickly to a situation 
presented by a movable vehicle. 
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doctrine, in Chambers v. Maroney,124 to include a lesser expectation of privacy when 
an item is moveable.125  
Along with a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile, the Court began to 
deal with cases involving containers in automobiles.  In 1948 in United States v. Di 
Re126 refused to extend the Carroll doctrine to include a search for containers of 
contraband on the body of the occupant but did confirm that all warrantless searches 
must be based on “reasonableness”.127  Even with a lesser expectation of privacy in 
an automobile, the Court held in several cases that containers could only be searched 
without a warrant under exigent circumstances,128 that the Fourth Amendment 
requires the police obtain a search warrant to search a closed container found in an 
automobile even though there is probable cause to believe that the container contains 
contraband;129 and that an officer’s authority to possess a container is distinct from 
his authority to examine it.130  There were some Justices who still believed that the 
word “automobile” was not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment 
disappeared.131 
In United States v. Ross132 the Court, in an effort to reconcile the Chambers-
Carney, and Chadwick-Sanders lines of authority, held that if there exists probable 
cause to search an entire car, then the authority to make a warrantless search of the 
vehicle extends to containers within the vehicle in which contraband might be 
concealed.133  
                                                                
124399 U.S. 42, 48-52 (1970) (reaffirming the exemption from the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement and further holding that a warrantless search of a vehicle may be delayed 
and conducted elsewhere if a warrantless search would have been proper at the time of the 
initial seizure.  The Court began to shift the focus to an expectation of privacy issue when in a 
mobile vehicle).  
125Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (holding that in contrast to a passenger’s reduced 
expectation of privacy, the governmental interest in effective law enforcement would be 
impaired without the ability to search the passenger’s belongings, since the automobile’s ready 
mobility creates the risk that evidence or contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant 
is obtained).  
126332 U.S. 581 (1998) (holding that the existence of reasonable cause for searching an 
automobile believed to be carrying contraband does not warrant the search of an occupant 
thereof, especially when if the contraband sought might be concealed on the person). 
127Id. at 585 (stating that the Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or 
seizures, but only such as are unreasonable). 
128United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
129Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
130Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). 
131Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443. 
132456 U.S. 798 (1982).  The Court wanted to provide specific guidance to police and 
courts in this recurring situation.  Id. at 826.  The Court reasoned that the scope of the 
warrantless search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container but rather by 
the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe the contraband 
will be found.  Id. at 834. 
133Id. at 807. 
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Finally, in 1991, the Rehnquist Court,134 looking for one clear-cut rule to govern 
automobile searches135 overruled Chadwick-Sanders in California v. Acevedo,136 
holding that containers in cars may be searched without a warrant whether the 
probable cause is specific or general.137 
IV.  SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S OPINION 
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court’s 6-3 decision.  Justice Scalia 
invoked British common law at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s creation as the 
beginning point for the 1999 inquiry138 to determine whether a particular 
governmental action is to be regarded as an unlawful search and seizure.139 
The Court began its opinion with the contention that historical evidence shows 
that the Framers would have regarded as acceptable a warrantless search of 
containers in an automobile if there was probable cause.140  The Court relied on 
United States v. Ross141 and California v. Acevedo142 to argue that during virtually the 
entire history of our country, whether contraband had been transported in a horse 
drawn carriage or in a 1921 roadster, it has been assumed that a lawful search of a 
vehicle would include a search of any container that might conceal the object of the 
search.143  
The Court summarized the Ross holding, emphasizing that if probable cause 
justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part 
of the vehicle and its contents,144 adding that later cases have characterized Ross as 
applying broadly to all containers within a car without qualification as to 
ownership.145  The Court added that if the rule announced in Ross was limited to a 
                                                                
134The Rehnquist Court 1986-Present.  See Abraham, supra note 25, at 349-69 (for a 
discussion on the make up of the Rehnquist Court and its views). 
135California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991). 
136Id. at 565. 
137Id. at 566-67. 
138Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299.  (the Court cited Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 
(1995) and California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991)).  Where that inquiry yields no 
answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness 
by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy 
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.  See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53, 
(1995).  
139Id. 
140Id. at 300. 
141456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
142500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
143456 U.S. at 820 n.26. 
144Id. at 825. 
145500 U.S. 572.  
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
592 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:575 
search of the contents of the belongings of the driver one would have expected the 
Court to have expressed that limit in the Ross decision.146  
Moreover, the Court declared that Ross was fully consistent—as the 
Respondent’s proposal was not—with the balancing claim that a permissible scope 
of a warrantless car search is defined by the object of the search and the places where 
there is probable cause to believe it may be found.147  The Court then supported its 
endorsement of Ross, declaring that “The critical element in a reasonable search is 
not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on 
the property to which entry is sought.”148 
The Court invoked historical evidence from the Founding era to buttress all of its 
arguments.  The Court likened present day police officers to 18th century customs 
officials examining packages and containers without regard to probable cause for 
each one149 in light of legislation enacted by Congress from 1789 through 1799 and 
beyond.150 
In this regard the Court noted that “even if the historical evidence, as described in 
Ross, were thought to be equivocal, we would find that the balancing of relative 
interest weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passenger’s 
belongings.151  The Court also relied on Cardwell v. Lewis152 to support the 
proposition that passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of 
privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars, which ‘travel public 
thoroughfares’.153  
Next the Court focused on the Wyoming Supreme Court’s finding that the 
“physical proximity” test154 did not convince them that it provided the most 
efficacious balance between legitimate individual and state interests.155  The Court 
noted that a warrantless seizure and search of a passenger’s purse did not give rise to 
the traumatic consequences156 of the type a search of one’s person would.  The Court 
                                                                
146456 U.S. at 834. 
147Id. at 824. 
148Zurcher v. Standford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978). 
149Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300-01. 
150Id. at 300. 
151Id. at 303. 
152417 U.S. 583 (1974) (allowing a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile parked 
in a parking lot when the driver was elsewhere by looking into the automobile windows and 
examining the exterior of the automobile). 
153Id. at 590. 
154State v. Andrews, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996) (holding that police may search all items 
found on the premises that are plausible repositories for the objects of the search, except those 
worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the 
warrant). 
155Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303. 
156Id. 
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distinguished the instant facts from those of United States v. Di Re,157 where there 
was a body search, and Ybarra v Illinois,158 where even a limited search of the outer 
clothing constitutes a severe intrusion on cherished personal security.159 
The Court then presented the dissent’s arguments and countered with criticisms 
of the dissent’s “strange criterion” “obvious ownership” argument and the dissent’s 
desire for individualized probable cause to search a passenger’s belongings.160 
The Court ended its opinion by positing that if they were to invent and exception 
from the historical practice that Ross described it would be perplexing that the 
exception should only protect a passenger’s belongings rather than (more logically) 
property belonging to anyone other than the driver.161  
Justice Breyer concurred with the “understanding that history is meant to inform, 
but not automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question”.162  
Moreover, in an effort to forestall the destruction of the bright-line rule established in 
Ross, Justice Breyer pointed out that the scope of the Court’s bright-line rule 
“Obviously . . . applies only to containers found within automobiles”.163  Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence ended with his understanding that a purse is a “special 
container” and that he was tempted to say “the search of a purse involves an 
intrusion so similar to a search of one’s person that the same rule should govern 
both”.164  However, in the end, he retreated from this line of argument and stated that 
Court has warned against making distinctions of this kind165 unless the woman’s 
purse, like a man’s billfold, were attached to her person,166 which in this case it was 
not.167 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented from the 
holding of the majority.168  The Justices began their dissent by making it very clear 
that there is an established precedent for warrants and individualized suspicion based 
on specific probable cause.169  Furthermore, the dissent stated that in all prior cases 
the automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied 
                                                                
157332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
158444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
159Id. at 88. 
160526 U.S. at 303-07. 
161Id. at 305. 
162Id. at 307.  (Breyer, J., concurring). 
163Id. at 308.  (Breyer, J., concurring). 
164Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
165526 U.S. at 308.  (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that it cannot necessarily be argued 
that the fact that the container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference (citing Ross, 
456 U.S. at 822)).  
166Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that outer clothing receives increased protection 
(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24)).  
167Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
168Id. at 309.  (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
169Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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only to the owner/defendant of the automobile.170  The dissent explained that in Di 
Re, the only case involving a search of a passenger/defendant, the Court 
overwhelmingly held that the exception to the warrant requirement did not apply.171  
In this section of the opinion, the dissent maintained that the Majority has 
fashioned a new rule rather than adhering to the settled distinctions between drivers 
and passengers.172  The dissent stated that the “newly minted test”173 is based on a 
distinction between property contained in clothing worn by a passenger and property 
in a “container” and it is quite plain that the intrusion on any container is as serious 
as the intrusion on clothing (as in Di Re).174  
Next, the dissent delineated the ruling in Ross to mean that the Court had rejected 
the notion that the scope of the warrantless search be defined by the nature of the 
container.175  Rather, Ross was concerned with the object of the search and the places 
where there was probable cause to believe it might be found.176  The dissent 
categorically stated that they disapproved of a container-based distinction between a 
man’s pocket and a woman’s purse.177  Moreover, the dissent was unconvinced by 
the “mere spatial association”178 between a passenger and a driver that the majority 
used as an acceptable basis for ignoring the privacy interests in a purse.179  
In the last part of the opinion, the dissent addressed the balancing view of the 
State’s legitimate interests in effective law enforcement and privacy issues.180  The 
dissent explained that to their knowledge the Court has never restricted themselves to 
a two-step Fourth Amendment approach “wherein the privacy and governmental 
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th century common law ‘yields no 
answer’.181  
                                                                
170526 U.S. at 309. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
171Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
172Id. at 309-10.  (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
173Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
174Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
175526 U.S. at 310. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
176Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
177Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
178Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
179Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  “We are not convinced that a 
person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from a search of his person to 
which he would be otherwise entitled.” (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 
(1948)).  See also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (emphasizing individualized 
suspicion); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (explaining that a person’s “mere 
propinquity” to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, 
give rise to probable cause to search that person). 
180526 U.S. at 311.  (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
181Id. (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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In sum, the dissent concluded that there was no reason to expand the ruling in 
Carroll to justify this arrest and search as incident to the search of the car.182  The 
dissent suggested that the Court had crafted an imaginative response to Di Re as well 
as being unable to support its own historical recitation.  Finally, the dissent stated 
that it was thankful that the Court’s automobile-centered extension of the warrant 
exception is limited in scope but concluded that it “does not justify the outcome in 
this case”.183 
V.  ANALYSIS  
This Note contends that the Court’s decision to adopt a container-based approach 
to the automobile warrant exception, to allow searches of passenger belongings 
based on the driver’s misconduct, is problematic.  The Houghton Court was wrong to 
adopt this new exception for three reasons.  First, the Court has erroneously 
interpreted the historical evidence behind the creation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, the Court, by chipping away at stare decisis, is disrupting the foundations of 
American jurisprudence and the development of the law.  Third, by creating a new 
lexicon, changing the meanings of the words, the Court is trying to define away the 
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
A.  Original Intent184 and Tradition: The Only Guides to the  
Fourth Amendment Question. 
Using original intent185 as the first step in determining the meaning of what 
protections the Fourth Amendment affords at the end of the 20th century is the 
present Court’s first line of attack.  
Justice Scalia considers the text of the Constitution to take priority over 
everything else and has characterized himself as an originalist186 who relies on the 
intentions of the Framers as revealed historically.  Thus, Justice Scalia in the 
majority opinion invokes British common law as it existed in the 18th century as the 
starting point for his argument concerning the meaning of the Fourth Amendment187 
today.  Herein lies the problem.  The crucial issue is not what (British) common law 
required but what the Fourth Amendment requires.188  If constitutional interpretation 
is simply a matter of identifying whether an historical practice was permitted in 
                                                                
182Id. at 312. 
183Id. at 313.  (Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
184Levy, supra note 76.  The term “original intent” stands for an old idea (emphasis added) 
that the Court should interpret the Constitution according to the understanding of it by the 
Framers.   
185Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Ordered Liberty: The Original Intent of the Constitution, 47 
MD. L. REV. 174, 175 (1987).  Original intent is viewed by some to mean that the courts and 
other branches of government should be bound by what can be divined of the intentions of 
those who wrote or ratified the Constitution.  Adherents to this position obtain solace from the 
supposed certainty of the static meaning provided in the face of changing circumstnaces. 
186Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
187Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300. 
188Maclin, supra note 47, at 961. 
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1789, it would be better to appoint historians to the Court and leave lawyers on the 
sidelines.  The country expects and deserves more than a history seminar when our 
fundamental rights are at stake.189  The purpose behind the creation of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Constitution is that the Framers meant the Constitution to mean 
more than it says, and more than they could have conceived.190 
Tradition is another of Justice Scalia’s routes to interpretation of the Constitution. 
Justice Scalia sees traditionalism as a corollary to originalism.191  In Houghton, 
Justice Scalia states that when a historical inquiry yields no answers, one must look 
at traditional standards to decipher the meaning of “reasonableness”, “intrusion on 
individual privacy” and “governmental interests”.192  Thus, when Justice Scalia 
compares the needs of customs officers in the 1780’s and 1790’s to present day 
police officers193 he is creating two problems.  
First, the Court’s comprehension of history and its traditions is selective. 
Selective understanding scans the past with a narrow focus and, in particular, with a 
view toward using the past to extract a definitive authoritative rule to resolve 
problems in the present.194  
Utilizing a selective view allows the majority to justify a container-based search 
without individualized probable cause for the person because the “interpretation” 
sees customs officers at common law, and for a short period in 1789, doing so and 
hence it must mean that the “interpretation “ is applicable today.195  Of course, the 
paradox is that history shows that the Revolution was fought and the Fourth 
Amendment created over just such problematic beliefs.196  
                                                                
189Tracey Maclin, Article, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the 
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 46 (1994).  
190Id. (citing TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 
(1969)); Taylor is considered a trailblazer for those rejecting the warrant preference rule.  Id. 
at 11. 
191David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 
1710 (1991).  Strauss believes that Scalia is positively reverential in his views about tradition. 
Id. at 1700. 
192526 U.S. at 300. 
193Id. 
194Robert A. Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Saclia’s Jurisprudence, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1690 (1991). 
195Maclin, supra note 47, at 19-20. When the proposed federal Constitution was debated in 
the Virginia Convention, Patrick Henry protested that federal excisemen could use general 
warrants to search cellars and bedrooms and seize any person without evidence of any crime. 
Henry protested against suspicionless searches whether or not carried out pursuant to general 
warrants.  Would anybody at the Convention have dared respond: “Settle down Pat, we’ll 
solve our problem, we’ll abolish general warrants—we’ll just let federal officers conduct the 
searches whenever and wherever they want without acting pursuant to general warrants. 
Congress will simply enact a law that permits it.”  In sum, the search and seizure practices of 
British authorities were opposed because of the arbitrary power exercised by customs officers 
(emphasis added) and Crown officials.  The Fourth Amendment was adopted to deter federal 
officers from exercising similar unrestrained power.  Id. 
196For what Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called the best historical presentation of 
American Fourth Amendment history see William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss4/8
1999] CRIMES AND ERRORS IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMIT: 597 
Second, our contemporary obligation to the past should not arise because we are 
constituted by our forebearers, but rather the past should derive from the same 
fundamental principle that comprises our obligations to one another today; our 
commitment to consensual relationships based on mutually acknowledged 
equality.197  Commitment to a consensual egalitarian conception of social 
relationships requires loyalty, but not subservience, to the past.198  
Arbitrarily fixing meaning at the intent of the founders robs America of the 
power to consent.  It dismisses two centuries of national dialogue with the 
Constitution and it ignores the significant growth in our understanding of the “Novus 
Ordo Seclorum” the Framers established.199  Why should we who have been molded 
by that history, not participate in that debate?200  In his concurrance in Houghton, 
even Justice Breyer conceded that “History is meant to inform, but not automatically 
to determine, the answer to the Fourth Amendment question.”201 
B.  Disrupting the Orderly Development of the Law: The End of Stare Decisis in 
Fourth Amendment Cases  
The question of why precedent should matter so much,202 has been heatedly 
debated by scholars for years.203  The usual response is that the law values 
certainty.204  But, given the Court’s sometimes quite rapid departure from precedent 
when it believes a particular precedent is unsound, perhaps the best answer is an 
institutional one: the Court is most qualified to read cases, especially it’s own.205  
                                                          
Origins and Original Meaning (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School: 
available from UMI Dissertation Services, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan). 
197Burt, supra note 194, at 1669. 
198Id. at 1697. 
199Mathias, supra note 185, at 176-77. 
200Id. at 177.  Justice Marshall stated, “When the Founders used the phrase “We the 
People” in 1787, they did not have in mind the majority of America’s citizens. A civil war, 
twenty-six amendments, and tremendous social, political, and technological changes have put 
flesh on the bones of the Constitution, thus altering our reading and our relationship to it. Why 
should we ignore history when we read the Constitution?”  Id. 
201526 U.S. at 307  (Breyer, J., concurring). 
202Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Article, Levels of Generality in the Definition of 
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1064 (1990).  See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
38 HARV. L. REV. 102 (1977) (for a view that stare decisis is not a rule but a principle that may 
be outweighed by other principles). 
203Id. at 1064. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987).  Most judges, 
lawyers, and commentators recognize the relevance of at least five types of constitutional 
argument: arguments from the plain, necessary, or historical meaning of the constitutional 
text; arguments about the intent of the framers; arguments of constitutional theory that reason 
from the hypothesized purposes that best explain either particular constitutional provisions or 
the constitutional text as a whole; arguments based on judicial precedent; and value arguments 
that assert claims about justice or social policy.  Id. 
204Tribe, supra note 202, at 1064. 
205Id. 
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Rightly or wrongly, constitutional meaning occurs primarily in the interpretation of 
prior cases.206 
In 1990, Justice Powell noted that reliance on precedent in general, and on stare 
decisis in particular, is important in constitutional cases because after two centuries 
of vast change, the original intent of the Founders is difficult to discern or is 
irrelevant.207  
More than any other Justice sitting today, Antonin Scalia is ready to reverse208 
prior Supreme Court precedent.209  Some scholars believe that Justice Scalia’s view 
on precedent relies on Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous aphorism that “it is revolting 
to have no better reason for a rule of law than it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV.”210  Yet others believe, connected to his originalism and traditionalism, he would 
find this anathema, rejecting the idea that the Constitution must change from age to 
age.211  Still, this categorically contradicts his originalist conception of being fully 
committed to the Framers meaning of the Constitution.212  
So why is Justice Scalia so open to overruling past cases?  The paradox lies in 
what some believe to be his quick use of abstract principles that are insensitive to 
practical realities and his cavalier attitude toward the views of past Justices who had 
thought carefully about the issues.213  
The Court in Houghton has for all intents and purposes overruled Di Re214 
making a passenger’s “mere presence” in an automobile enough justification to 
require a search of the passenger’s belongings when there is only probable cause to 
                                                                
206Id.  The Court has nominally based even its boldest innovations in constitutional law 
upon precedent. For instance, Justice Stone argued that state-sanctioned discriminatory 
practices against “discrete and insular minorities” merit a diminished presumption of 
constitutionality neither because he believed such discrimination was intrinsically evil, nor 
because the structure of the Constitution marks discrete and insular minorities as special but 
rather, because he located this principle in prior cases.  Id. (citing United States v. Carolene 
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
207Lewis F. Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 
289 (1990). 
208See Strauss, supra note 191, at 1699 (“[w]e knew from the start that Justice Scalia was 
not a great fan of stare decisis”).  
209Burt, supra note 194, at 1685.  See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling for the overruling of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 
(1950)); Puerto Rico v. Barnstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) (overruling Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 
U.S. 66 (1861)); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (overruling O’Callahan v. 
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 
U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852)); Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and 
Pub. Tansp, 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep’t, 377 
U.S. 184 (1964). 
210O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 (1920). 
211Burt, supra note 194, at 1686-87. 
212Id. at 1688.  
213Id. at 1700. 
214332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
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search the driver.  Moreover, the Court has overruled the true holding in Ross,215 
which concluded that the historical evidence that permits a warrantless search “is 
defined by the object of the search and where the places in which there is probable 
cause to believe that it may be found.”216  By so doing, the Court has also overruled 
its previous view of what history had informed them to be the correct view of an 
exception to the warrant requirement based on probable cause for persons.217  “The 
People” and individualized probable cause are gone and the police have now taken 
the place of the neutral magistrate in deciding what is reasonable.218   
C.  The New Lexicon: Define Away Fourth Amendment Protections 
In every language there are assumptions that give meaning to a text.  The external 
world and cultural experiences also supply an extra-textual meaning to a language.  
But, people speak to each other or write novels or laws or journal articles because 
they accept that they are each supplying the same irreducible meaning.219  The Court 
in Houghton seems to be redefining the irreducible meanings that as a society we 
have all agreed upon.  
We the people of the United States of America agree to the irreducible meaning 
of the concepts upon which our nation was founded.  First, that all men are 
“endowed with certain unalienable rights220 that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among 
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”.221  Second, We 
the people, agree that those who won our independence believed that the final end of 
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties.  We agree that in 
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary, that the value of 
liberty is both an end and a means and that liberty is the secret of happiness and 
courage the secret of liberty.222  Finally, we all agree upon the irreducible meaning 
that the Framers of the Constitution conferred, as against the Government, the right 
to be left alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.223 
                                                                
215456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
216Id. at 824. 
217526 U.S. at 307.  The Court’s decision in Ross was based on a similar historical inquiry.  
Id. 
218Maclin, supra note 47, at 13 (stating that the warrant requirement tells us, and the 
police, that unsupervised searches should not be the norm, that warrantless intrusions must be 
justified by more than convenience (cost-benefit analysis), and that police discretion should be 
restrained).  
219Tribe, supra note 202, at 1204-07. 
220Other state constitutions also reflect agreement.  “All men are born free and equal, and 
have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights.”  MASS. CONST. (1778).  
221THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
222Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
223277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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The dissent in Houghton believes that based on its imaginative footnote in Di 
Re224 the Court had changed the focus from Di Re’s status as mere occupant of the 
vehicle and the importance of individualized suspicion, to a case concerning 
“reasonableness” of the intrusion.225  This redefinition of the meaning of Di Re 
allowed the Court to expand the Carroll Doctrine and remove immunities from a 
search by mere presence in an automobile.226  
The Court also redefines the meaning of words.  Container, usually defined as a 
receptacle, in Houghton includes a purse, usually defined as a woman’s handbag 
used for carrying money and personal items.227  The distinction drawn between a 
suitcase228 and a very personal belonging, a purse, that women wear is gone.229  Even 
Justice Breyer in his concurrence felt uneasy with this new synonymous definition.  
Moreover, Justice Breyer also seemed to intuit that a purse was more like a man’s 
billfold230 than a receptacle.  Reconfiguring the holding of previous Courts and 
redefining the Fourth Amendment is putting the exclusionary rule in jeopardy.  With 
similar cases being heard before state courts231 today, the magnitude of Houghton 
will be felt momentarily.  
The Constitution succeeded in solving the pressing problems the young nation 
faced in 1787.  It was designed to prevent tyranny, rather than promote efficiency.  It 
was designed to focus governmental power on its legitimate objectives . . . to remain 
fenced out of our houses and the private precincts of our lives.232  Let us hope that 
Justice Breyer is correct and the Court’s “newly minted” test confines itself only to 
                                                                
224332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
225526 U.S. at 311 n.2. 
226Id. at 300.  The dissent stated that it saw no reason to extend Carroll in this way.  Id. 
(Stevens, J., Souter, J., Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
227THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1989). 
228United States v. Robbins, 453 U.S. 420 (1973); Sanders, 422 U.S. at 753; United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Ross, 456 U.S. at 798; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 
(1983); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); United States v. Place, 463 U.S. 696 (1983); 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
229Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295. 
230Id. at 308. 
231United States v. 404,905.00 in United States Currency, 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Zabala, 52 F. Supp. 2d 
377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Avery v. Mitchell, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5670 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 
1999); United States v. Hambrick, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10384 (W.D. Va. July 7, 1999); 
People v. Hart, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 776 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Aug. 23, 1999); People v. 
Cartwright, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1362 (Cal. App. 1999); Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 
1999); State v. Lux, 1999 ME 136 (Me. 1999); State v. Salvato, Hamilton County App. No. C-
980939, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3716 (Ohio Ct. App., Hamilton County Aug. 13, 1999); State 
v. Hirning, 592 N.W.2d 600 (S.D. 1999); Newman v. State, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5043 
(Tex. App. Dallas July 9, 1999); Gallegos v. State, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5042 (Tex. App. 
Dallas July 9, 1999); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 514 S.E.2d 357 (Va. App. 1999); State v. 
Matejka, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 966 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 1999). 
232Mathias, supra note 185, at 179. 
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Fourth Amendment automobile exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and will not 
extend to our bodies or our homes.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.233 
                                                                
233See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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